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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967,969 -70 (Utah 1989)

Knox v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 196 F.2d 112 (C.A.10 1952)
Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 477, 479 (Utah 1897)
Wayment v. Clear Channel Borad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, f 15,116 P.3d 271 (Utah 2005)
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
Rules
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
§78-2-2, § 78-2a-3.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court made a conclusion of law that a deed of trust was not a valid
agreement because no consideration passed between Defendant Allen Olsen and his
son, Steven Olsen. However, under the law, it is not necessary that the consideration
pass directly from the obligee to the obligor. A benefit to a third person may be
sufficient consideration for a promise. Did the trial court err when it ruled that the
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deed of trust is not a valid agreement for failure of consideration?
The trial court made a conclusion of law that a deed of trust was not a valid
agreement because no promissory note evidenced the debt. However, under the
equitable rules of estoppel, a promise is enforceable where a party acts
inconsistently with a later claim, the other party reasonably acts based on the first
party's act, and injury to the second party would result. Did the trial court err
when it declined to apply the estoppel doctrine to the facts of this case?
Standard of Review
A summary judgment determination is reviewed for correctness, with no
deference granted to the district court's legal conclusions. Wayment v. Clear
Channel Borad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, % 15,116 P.3d 271 (Utah 2005).
Plaintiffs, the Andersons, made the argument that the benefit of the contract
was for Mr. Olsen's son in the January 11, 2006 hearing on motions for summary
judgment. Hearing Tr. p. 27,11.18-21. The Andersons made the argument in the
hearing on motions for summary judgment that Mr. Olsen should be estopped from
asserting that the deed of trust was invalid for lack of an underlying note. Hearing
Tr. p. 26,1.19 - p. 28,1. 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns a loan made by Plaintiffs Boyd and Marilyn Anderson
to Steven Olsen, the son of Defendant Allen Olsen. Both parties moved for summary
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judgment and on January 11, 2006, the trial court heard arguments. On March 22,
2006 the court issued its order granting summary judgment to Defendant Allen
Olsen and denying summary judgment to Plaintiffs the Andersons.
In 1995 Allen Olsen and his son, Steven Olsen, entered into a real estate
purchase contract under which Steven would purchase from Allen real estate used
in Allen's insurance business. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibit "B." The real estate purchase did not occur at that
time. Hearing tr. p. 21. f 2 -p. 22, f 4. In 1998 Defendant's son, Steven Olsen, who
was married to Plaintiffs' daughter, asked to borrow money from the Plaintiffs, the
Andersons, in order to purchase his father's insurance business. Hearing Tr. p. 2,
Memorandum Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Undisputed Material
Facts %% 1-3. The Andersons agreed to loan the money on the condition that Steve
Olsen provide security for the loan. Hearing Tr. p. 22,11.1-8, Memorandum
Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Undisputed Material Facts %% 2,3.
Steven Olsen asked his father, Plaintiff Allen Olsen, to sign a deed of trust to secure
the loan. Memorandum Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, Undisputed
Material Facts f 4. Plaintiff Allen Olsen signed the deed of trust listing as
beneficiaries Plaintiffs, the Andersons, and listing as security for the loan Allen
Olsen's real property. Id. Undisputed Material Facts f 5.
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Using the deed of trust as collateral, Steven Olsen obtained the loan he had
discussed with the Andersons in the amount of $151, 000.00. Id. Undisputed
Material Facts f 7. The Andersons subsequently recorded the deed of trust. Id.
Unbeknownst to the Andersons, before borrowing the money from the Olsens using
the deed of trust as collateral, Steven Olson had told his father that Steven did not
intend to purchase his father's insurance business. Id. at f 6. There never was any
direct communication between Allen Olsen and the Andersons regarding the
dispersement of the loan to Steven. Id. at f 8. A promissory note was drawn up
evidencing the debt but was not signed by Allen Olsen. Id. f 5. Steven Olsen made
payments on the loan until he defaulted in July of 2001. Id. at % 10. Steven
discharged the obligation to the Andersons in bankruptcy and the Andersons,
unable therefore to pursue Steven, now seek to foreclose on the deed of trust. Id. at

tn.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
/. The trial court erred when it made a conclusion of law that the deed of trust was not a
valid agreement because no consideration passed between Defendant Allen Olsen and
his son, Steven Olsen, as there existed consideration running from the Andersons to Allen
Olsen's son, Steven.
The trial court concluded that the deed of trust is not a valid agreement due
to failure of consideration. According to the court, Allen Olsen's pledge of collateral
for the debt of Steven Olsen was given solely in exchange for his son's promise to
5

buy the insurance business.
But the deed of trust executed by Allen Olsen was a promise to provide
security to the Andersons for a loan the Andersons subsequently made to Allen
Olsen's son, Steven. It is an agreement not between Allen Olsen and his son but
between Allen Olsen and the Andersons. Consideration runs from the Andersons to
the Olsen's son, Steven. It is not necessary that the consideration pass directly from
the Andersons to Allen Olsen.
Steven Olsen asked his in-laws, the Andersons, for a loan. The Andersons were
willing to lend Steven the money if he provided some security. A deed of trust was therefore
executed between Allen Olsen and his wife, now deceased, as trustors, and the Andersons as
beneficiaries. Allen Olsen thereby promised the Andersons to guarantee payment of a loan
if the Andersons made the loan to Allen Olsen's son, Steven. Making the loan to Steven was
consideration for Allen Olsen's promise. Therefore the trial court erred when it
concluded that the deed of trust was not a valid agreement for failure of
consideration.
II. The trial court committed error when it made a conclusion of law that the deed of
trust was not validfor lack of a promissory note as the doctrine of equitable estoppel
ought to apply to the facts of this case
The trial court concluded that the deed of trust was not valid because Allen
Olsen never signed a promissory note to evidence the debt under the deed. But here
the elements of equitable estoppel are met. There is an act by one party inconsistent
6

with a claim later asserted, reasonable action by the other party taken on the basis of the
first party's act, and injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first
party to contradict or repudiate such act.
Steven Olsen approached the Andersons for a loan. The Andersons agreed to lend
Steven the money if he provided them with security. A deed of trust was therefore executed
between Allen Olsen and his wife, now deceased, as trustors, and the Andersons as
beneficiaries. Allen Olsen thereby promised the Andersons to guarantee payment of a loan
if the Andersons made the loan to Allen Olsen's son, Steven. Steven Olsen provided the
Andersons with the deed of trust and, they being satisfied with the security, reasonably
relied on it and loaned Steven the money. Now Allen Olsen asserts that, even though he
agreed to secure the loan to his son, and even though the Andersons, in reliance on that
security, loaned Steven the money, the deed of trust is not valid. Steven Olsen has
discharged his debts in bankruptcy, and the deed of trust is the only recourse the Andersons
have to recover any of what they loaned Allen Olsen's son. Allen Olsen should therefore be
estopped from asserting that the lack of a written promissory note renders his promise to
guarantee the loan, the deed of trust, invalid.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court erred when it made a conclusion of law that the deed of trust was
not a valid agreement because no consideration passed between Defendant Allen E.
Olsen and his son, Steven G. Olsen, as there existed consideration running from the
Andersons to Allen Olsen's son, Steven.
7

The trial court concluded that the deed of trust is not a valid agreement due to
failure of consideration. Order, Conclusions of Law, % 3. According to the court,
Allen Olsen's pledge of collateral for the debt of Steven Olsen was given solely in
exchange for his son's promise to buy the insurance business. Id. Evidence
supporting the court's ruling includes the real estate purchase agreement under
which Steven Olsen would purchase real property used in the real estate business
from Allen Olsen, and the fact that no note was signed by Allen Olsen.
But the deed of trust executed by Allen Olsen is a promise to provide security
to the Andersons for a loan the Andersons subsequently made to Allen Olsen's son,
Steven. It is an agreement not between Allen Olsen and his son but between Allen
Olsen and the Andersons. While consideration does not run from the Andersons to
Allen Olsen, it does run from the Andersons to the Olsen's son, Steven. It is not
necessary that the consideration pass directly from the Andersons to Allen Olsen.
See, e.g., Knox v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 196 F.2d 112,118 (C.A.IO 1952)(saying, "It
is not necessary that the consideration pass directly from the obligee to the obligor.
It is sufficient if there be detriment or disadvantage to the obligee and an element of
benefit or advantage to the obligor, or to a third person at his request"), see also
Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 477, 479 (Utah 1897).
Steven Olsen asked his in-laws, the Andersons, for a loan. Order, Findings of
Fact, f f 2-3. The Andersons were willing to lend Steven the money if he provided some

8

security. Id. A deed of trust was therefore executed between Allen Olsen and his wife, now
deceased, as trustors, and the Andersons as beneficiaries. Id. at f 3. Allen Olsen thereby
promised the Andersons to guarantee payment of a loan if the Andersons made the loan to
Allen Olsen's son, Steven. Making the loan to Steven was consideration for Allen Olsen's
promise. Therefore the trial court erred when it concluded that the deed of trust was
not a valid agreement for failure of consideration.
POINT II
The trial court committed error when it made a conclusion of law that the deed
of trust was not valid for lack of a promissory note as the doctrine of equitable
estoppel ought to apply to the facts of this case
The trial court concluded that the deed of trust was not valid because Allen
Olsen never signed a promissory note to evidence the debt under the deed. Order,
Conclusions of Law, f 4. While the Andersons through their attorney asserted a
theory of estoppel before the court, Hearing Tr. p. 26,1.19 - p. 28,1. 4, the court did not
address in its order why it failed to apply the doctrine in this case. Equitable estoppel
requires proof of three elements: (i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure
to act; and (Hi) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. CECO Corp. v.
Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967,969 -70 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).
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Here, Steven Olsen approached the Andersons for a loan. Order, Findings of Fact,
f f 2-3. The Andersons agreed to lend Steven the money if he provided them with security.
Id. A deed of trust was therefore executed between Allen Olsen and his wife, now deceased,
as trustors, and the Andersons as beneficiaries. Id. at % 3. Allen Olsen thereby promised the
Andersons to guarantee payment of a loan if the Andersons made the loan to Allen Olsen's
son, Steven. Steven Olsen provided the Andersons with the deed of trust and, they being
satisfied with the security, reasonably relied on it and loaned Steven the money. Now Allen
Olsen asserts that, even though he agreed to secure the loan to his son, and even though the
Andersons, in reliance on that security, loaned Steven the money, the deed of trust is not
valid. Steven Olsen has discharged his debts in bankruptcy, id. at ^f 11, and the deed of
trust is the only recourse the Andersons have to recover any of what they loaned Allen
Olsen's son. Allen Olsen should therefore be estopped from asserting that the lack of a
written promissory note renders his promise to guarantee the loan, the deed of trust,
invalid.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court's grant in favor of Defendant's motion for
summary judgment and denial of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be
reversed. Plaintiffs, the Andersons ask for an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal.
DATED this _ 2 L ^ l d a y of September, 2006.

Douglas L^Neeley (#6290)
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